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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Medicare will begin providing coverage for outpatient prescription drugs beginning January 
2006 under a new Part D of the program.  Beneficiaries will be able to obtain prescription drug 
coverage either from stand-alone insurance policies or through Medicare managed care plans.  
Subsidies will be available to beneficiaries who qualify based on low incomes and limited assets.  
These low-income subsidies will offer substantial assistance in paying the Part D premium and 
cost sharing associated with drug coverage.   
 
Those who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid will automatically be deemed eligible 
for low-income subsidies.  Other low-income beneficiaries will have to meet both an income and 
asset test to receive assistance. Asset tests are generally used for low-income programs to focus 
benefits on truly low-income people and exclude those with limited incomes but substantial 
assets.   Individuals who meet the income threshold but whose assets exceed a specified limit 
will not qualify for low-income subsidies (Exhibit E.S. 1).  
 
To illustrate, a person whose income 
is below 135 percent of the federal 
poverty level (FPL) but has assets 
exceeding $6,000 (individual) or 
$9,000 (couple) would not meet the 
asset test and thus not be eligible for 
low-income subsidies – unless he or 
she were dually covered by 
Medicare and Medicaid.  The 
definition of countable assets does 
not include the value of a house, 
automobiles, or household 
furnishings and possessions.  
  
This report assesses how the low-
income asset test works under the 
Medicare prescription drug benefit.  It examines the number and characteristics of people likely 
to be excluded and whether the asset test is unduly restrictive in excluding people who are in 
need of assistance.   
 
The study examines three main questions: 
 
 How many and what percentage of Medicare beneficiaries will be eligible for low-
income prescription drug subsidies? 
 How many and what percentage of Medicare beneficiaries meet the income test but are 
precluded from such subsidies because they do not qualify under the asset test?  What 
types of assets are primarily responsible for precluding eligibility? 
 What are the characteristics of those who are excluded from the subsidies because they 
do not qualify under the asset test? 
 
Exhibit E.S.1
25% up to initial coverage 
limit; 100% up to $3,600 
out-of-pocket spending
$250$35All others
sliding 
scale up 
to $35
$0
$0
$0
Monthly 
Premium
$50
$0
$0
$0
Annual 
Deductible
15% of total costs up to 
$5,100 catastrophic limit; 
$2/generic $5/brand-name 
thereafter
Income 135%-150% FPL
($12,920-$14,355/individual in 2005)
and assets <$10,000/indiv; 
$20,000/couple
$2/generic $5/brand-name;
no copays after total drug 
costs reach $5,100
Full-benefit dual eligible
Income greater than 100% FPL
$2/generic $5/brand-name;
no copays after total drug 
costs reach $5,100
Income less than 135% FPL 
($12,920/individual in 2005)
and assets <$6,000/individual; 
$9,000/couple
$1/generic $3/brand-name;
no copays after total drug 
costs reach $5,100
Full-benefit dual eligible
Income up to 100% FPL
($9,570/individual in 2005)
CopaymentsLow-Income Subsidy 
Levels 
Overview of Low-Income Part D Benefits, 2006
SOURCE:  Kaiser Family Foundation Summary of the MMA 2003
  
Exhibit E.S.2 
Projected Eligibility for Low-Income Subsidies, 2006 
 
Total non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries 39.18 m 
      
Not eligible for low-income subsidies (based on 
income) 
 
25.21 m 
       
Potentially eligible for low-income subsidies 
(based on income alone or dual eligibility status) 
 
13.97 m 
 
Low-income beneficiaries not eligible for low-
income subsidies due to asset test 
 
  2.37 m
 
Total eligible for low-income subsidies 
 
11.60 m 
 
Source: Rice and Desmond for the Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005.
 Data and Methods 
 
This study uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally 
representative panel survey that collects information on non-institutionalized individuals’ 
incomes and assets.  The current study uses interviews of the 2001 panel that occurred between 
October 2002 and January 2003, and refers to the period September to December 2002.  All 
Medicare beneficiaries on SIPP were selected (n=9,278) for this analysis, including both seniors 
and those eligible due to disability.  Each sample member’s income was compared to the federal 
poverty level and his or her assets to the asset test threshold, adjusting for the anticipated 
experience in 2006, when the new prescription drug benefit goes into effect.  Then, assets that 
were primarily responsible for precluding eligibility were assessed, as well as the characteristics 
of individuals who were precluded from the subsidies because they would fail the asset test.   
 
Findings   
 
Nearly 14 million non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries would qualify for low-income 
subsidized prescription drug benefits in 2006 based on income alone.  That is, their incomes are 
below 150% of poverty (Exhibit E.S. 2).   
 
• An estimated 2.37 
million Medicare 
beneficiaries with 
incomes below 150% 
poverty are expected to 
be ineligible for low-
income subsidies due to 
the asset test.   
 
• Among these 2.37 
million, approximately 70 
percent have incomes 
below 135% of the 
federal poverty level; 
30% having incomes 
between 135% and 150% 
of the federal poverty 
level. 
 
  
• Those projected to be ineligible for low-income subsidies because of the asset test are 
disproportionately widows and widowers (46 percent).  
 
o Among these widows and widowers, 93% are female. The most likely scenario is that 
when a husband dies, income plummets, making the widow potentially eligible for 
the low-income prescription drug subsidies.  However, her accumulated assets exceed 
  
those allowed under the legislation.  Aggravating the situation is that asset thresholds 
are lower for individuals than for couples. 
 
• While asset tests are generally intended to focus benefits on those with low incomes and 
exclude those with substantial assets, a large proportion of the 2.37 million low-income 
beneficiaries who would not qualify for the additional subsidies had relatively modest assets.   
 
o Half of those with incomes exceeding the asset test have excess assets of $35,000 or 
less, and 42% exceed the limit by $25,000 or less.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The study’s findings raise serious questions about the equity of the asset test.  During their 
working years, Americans are encouraged to save for retirement and the possibility that they will 
face sizable long-term care expenses.  Those to whom this message is most salient will have little 
or no income beyond what they receive from Social Security.  By accumulating modest amounts 
of assets, either through bank accounts or retirement-savings vehicles, these same people have 
guaranteed that they will not qualify for the low-income Medicare drug subsidies – but a large 
majority use prescription drugs every day.  Modifying or eliminating the asset test would help 
protect those disadvantaged by low incomes – especially widows – who would be excluded from 
additional subsidized prescription drug benefits due to the asset test.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Amidst both fanfare and controversy, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003 was signed into law by President Bush in December of that 
year.  The centerpiece of the legislation was coverage of outpatient prescription drugs, a 
benefit absent from Medicare during the program’s first 40 years.  This new drug coverage 
takes effect in January 2006. 
 The legislation provides voluntary, subsidized prescription drug coverage that can be 
obtained either from stand-alone insurance policies or through Medicare managed care plans.  
The specific style of benefit has been referred to as having a “doughnut hole” because during 
a given year, there may be a portion of expenditures for which no coverage is provided.   This 
gap, combined with other cost sharing features, means that many beneficiaries will still have 
to pay a sizeable portion of their prescription costs.  An individual spending $5,000 a year for 
covered drugs would pay a total of $3,500 out-of-pocket, not including a premium averaging 
$420 per year in 2006. 
 A subsidy intended to provide assistance for low-income Medicare beneficiaries is the 
focus of this report.  This subsidy is necessary because otherwise, drug coverage would not be 
affordable for such individuals, and would be far more costly than is now the case for 
beneficiaries who are dually covered by Medicare and Medicaid.  Once the prescription drug 
provisions are implemented in January 2006, individuals who are dually covered by Medicare 
and Medicaid will receive their drug benefits through the Medicare program rather than 
through Medicaid, as is currently the case.    
In order to qualify for low-income subsidies, a beneficiary must meet specific income 
and asset guidelines.  The low-income subsidies will offer substantial assistance in paying the 
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Part D premium and cost sharing associated with drug coverage.  The level of assistance will 
vary depending on an individuals’ income and assets.  Individuals who meet the income 
threshold but whose assets exceed a specified limit would not qualify for low-income 
subsidies.   
 As an example, a person who is not dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, and 
who has income below 135% of the federal poverty level (FPL), will fail the test and thus not 
be eligible for the low-income subsidies if she has assets exceeding $6,000 (individual) or 
$9,000 (couple).  The definition of countable assets does not include the value of a house and 
automobiles, or household furnishings and possessions.   
 This study addresses three key questions regarding the asset test: 
 How many and what percentage of Medicare beneficiaries will be eligible for low-
income prescription drug subsidies? 
 
 How many and what percentage of Medicare beneficiaries are precluded from such 
subsidies because they do not qualify under the asset test?  What types of assets are 
primarily responsible for precluding eligibility? 
 
 What are the characteristics of those who are excluded from the subsidies because they 
do not qualify under the asset test?  Are there variations by age, gender, race, 
education, family composition, geographic location, supplemental health insurance 
status, and/or health status? 
 
The remainder of the report is organized as follows.  Section II provides additional 
background information on the low-income subsidies under the new law, an indication of the 
extent to which eligibility for the low-income subsidies can reduce drug expenditures, and 
previous research relevant to this study.  Section III discusses the data and methodology 
employed.  The answers to the research questions are provided in Section IV, and Section V 
provides the study’s conclusions and policy implications. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 
Low-Income Subsidies Under the Law 
The new Medicare drug benefit will go into effect on January 1, 2006.  As noted in 
Exhibit 1, which illustrates standard Medicare drug coverage to be provided at that time,  
there is a $250 annual deductible; 25% coinsurance for the next $2,000 in spending during the 
year (i.e., 75% coverage); no coverage for the next $2,850 in annual spending; and five 
percent coinsurance (i.e., 95% coverage) for all covered drug spending exceeding $5,100 
during 2006.  It is estimated that premiums for stand-alone plans will cost beneficiaries 
approximately $35/month in 2006.1  All of these amounts are indexed with inflation, defined 
as the annual growth in per capita Medicare prescription drug spending. 
 
 
Certain low-income 
individuals are eligible for 
substantial subsidies.  As 
illustrated in Exhibit 2, 
there are two groups of 
Medicare beneficiaries 
eligible for low-income 
subsidies.  The first 
includes those who qualify automatically because they are eligible for Medicaid, 
Supplemental Security Income, QMB, SLMB, or QI;2 such individuals are frequently referred 
to as those “dually eligible” for Medicare and Medicaid.  The second includes others who 
Medicare Beneficiaries’ Out-of-Pocket Drug 
Spending Under New Medicare Rx Benefit, 2006
+ ~$420 in annual premiums
New Medicare Legislation
Deductible $250
No 
Coverage
Catastrophic
Coverage
Partial
Coverage
up to Limit
$2,250
$5,100 
(equivalent to $3,600 in
out-of-pocket spending)
25%
5%
$2850 Gap
Beneficiary   
Out-of-Pocket 
Spending
Medicare Pays 75%
Medicare Pays 95%
Exhibit 1
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation illustration of standard Medicare drug benefit in 2006.
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have incomes below 150% of the FPL and assets less than $10,000 (individual) or $20,000 
(couple).  To provide some context, the federal poverty level in 2005 was $9,570 for a single 
person, and $12,830 for a two-person family.3 
The subsidy a person qualifies for depends on his or her income and asset levels.  
Exhibits 2 and 3 provide labels for three different benefit levels (Subsidy groups A, B, and C).  
A fourth group – eligible individuals who are institutionalized – is not included because data 
limitations necessitate that this report focus on the non-institutionalized population.4 
 
Exhibit 2
Assistance for Non-institutionalized Low-Income Beneficiaries
(estimated counts in millions)
Medicare 
beneficiaries
(39.18)
Dual eligibles
(4.74)
Non-duals
(34.44)
Income < 150%
poverty
(9.23)
Income < 100% 
poverty
Subsidy group A
(2.51)
Income ≥100%
poverty
Subsidy group B
(2.23)
Income ≥ 150%
poverty
No subsidy
(25.21)
Income < 135%
poverty
(7.28)
Income 135 to 
< 150% poverty
(1.95)
Assets
< $6,000 (individual),
or $9,000 (couple)
Subsidy group B
(5.32)
Assets
≥ $10,000 (individual),
or $20,000 (couple)
No subsidy
(1.66)
Assets
$6,000-9,999 (individual),
or $9,000-19,999 (couple)
Subsidy group C
(0.30)
Assets
< $10,000 (individual), 
or $20,000 (couple)
Subsidy group C
(1.24)
Assets
≥ $10,000 (individual), 
or $20,000 (couple)
No subsidy
(0.71)
Source: Authors’ analysis of Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 panel, Wave 6.
 
 
As shown in Exhibit 2, Subsidy group A consists of dual eligibles with incomes below 
100% of the FPL.  Subsidy group B is comprised of two-subgroups: dually-eligible 
individuals with incomes above 100% of the FPL; and those not dually eligible, but with 
incomes below 135% of the FPL ($12,920/individual; $17,321/couple, in 2005) and assets 
below $6,000 (individual) or $9,000 (couple).  Similarly, two subgroups of non-dually 
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eligible individuals make up Subsidy group C:  those with incomes below 135% of the FPL 
and assets between $6,000 and $10,000 (individual) or $9,000 and $20,000 (couple); and 
those with incomes between 135 and 150% of the FPL, and assets less than $10,000 
(individual) and $20,000 (couple).  The following non-dually-eligible individuals do not 
qualify for the subsidies:  those with incomes above 150% of the FPL, and those with assets 
exceeding $10,000 (individual) or $20,000 (couple). 
Exhibit 3 shows the drug benefit for each of the three subsidy groups in 2006.  Those 
in Subsidy groups A and B pay no premiums and are responsible only for relatively small out-
of-pocket copayments for each prescription they receive, varying from $1 to $2 for generic 
and $2 to $5 for brand name drugs.5  Subsidy group C pays more, including a premium that is 
proportional to how close their income is to 135% of the FPL (vs. 150%); 15% of drug 
spending between their $50 annual deductible and the $3,600 out-of-pocket cost threshold 
(which could result in a maximum payment of about $530); and copayments of $2 (generic) 
or $5 (brand name) per prescription, thereafter.  No one receiving a low-income subsidy is 
subject to the doughnut hole of no coverage. 
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Exhibit 3 
Subsidized Prescription Drug Benefits in 2006 
 
Subsidy 
Group* 
Premium Deductible 
Cost Sharing Below 
Out-of-Pocket 
Threshold+ 
Cost Sharing Above 
Out-of-Pocket 
Threshold 
A $0 $0 
$1 (generic) 
$3 (brand name)^ 
per prescription 
$0 
B $0 $0 
$2 (generic) 
$5 (brand name) 
per prescription 
$0 
C Sliding scale# $50 15% coinsurance 
$2 (generic) 
$5 (brand name) 
per prescription 
* See Exhibit 2 for a definition of who falls into each subsidy group. 
+ The out-of-pocket threshold is $3,600 in 2006. 
^ The statute also requires that insurers apply the generic copayment levels to preferred multiple source drugs. 
# The scale ranges from a zero-premium level at 135% of the FPL, to the full premium at 150% of the FPL that is 
paid by beneficiaries ineligible for the low-income subsidies. 
 
Impact of Eligibility on Potential Out-of-Pocket Expenditures 
 Eligibility for low-income subsidies is likely to have a dramatic impact on out-of-
pocket expenditures for prescription drugs.  CMS estimates that on average, beneficiaries 
receiving the low-income subsidy would spend just $170 out-of-pocket in 2006, compared to 
$1,122 without the subsidy – plus savings in premiums of up to $440/year.6  
Similarly, a report jointly prepared by the Actuarial Research Corporation and the 
Kaiser Family Foundation in November 2004 employed an actuarial projection model to 
examine the impact of the legislation on out-of-pocket costs.7  This study concluded that near-
poor persons who receive the low-income subsidies would pay far less out-of-pocket than 
those who do not qualify.  Among those with incomes between 100% and 134% of the FPL, 
annual out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs are expected to average $149 for those 
receiving the subsidies, compared to $1,086 for those not receiving them.  The figures for 
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beneficiaries with incomes between 135% and 149% of the FPL are $283 and $979, 
respectively. 
 To further illustrate the importance of the low-income subsidies, the following 
example shows how much a Medicare beneficiary would be expected to pay per year for 
medication to treat a common chronic condition: high cholesterol.  The most frequently-
prescribed drug for treating high cholesterol is Lipitor.8  The cost of a 90-day supply over the 
Internet is $276 (20 mg.), or $1,104/year.9  Most users of statins are prescribed brand-name 
drugs, like Lipitor, but there are generic equivalents, which can be purchased for $94 for a 90-
day supply, or $376/year.10  The amount of money that a beneficiary would pay out-of-pocket, 
under various scenarios, is shown in Exhibit 4. 
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Exhibit 4 
Estimated Annual Out-of-Pocket Costs of Prescription Drugs to Treat High Cholesterol, 
by Subsidy Level 
Subsidy Group* Cost Sharing Requirements 
Out-of-Pocket 
Costs 
per year, Lipitor+ 
Out-of-Pocket 
Costs per year, 
Generic Statin 
A 
$0 deductible 
$1 (generic) & $3 
(brand name) per 
prescription 
$12 $4 
B 
$0 deductible 
$2 (generic) & $5 
(brand name)^ per 
prescription 
$20 $8 
C $50 deductible 15% coinsurance $208 $99 
No low-income 
subsidy, assuming no 
other drug costs 
$250 deductible 
25% coinsurance $464 $282 
No low-income 
subsidy, assuming 
expenditure falls  in 
“doughnut hole”# 
$2850 gap in coverage $1,104 $376 
* The out-of-pocket threshold is $3,600 in 2006. 
+ The cost of Lipitor on the website, www.drugstore.com is $276 for a 90-day supply.  The figures in the table 
assume that Lipitor would not receive the same preferred status as does the generic statin, by the insurer 
providing the prescription drug coverage. 
^ The statue also requires that insurers apply the generic copayment levels to preferred multiple source drugs. 
# This assumption is based upon an individual having other drug costs over $2,250 so that the expenditures on 
Lipitor fall in the doughnut hole of no coverage. 
 
 
Those eligible for the two most generous levels of subsidies would pay almost nothing 
for the drugs: $12 – 20 per year for Lipitor, and $4 – 8 per year for the generic.  Beneficiaries 
in the less generous subsidy category would pay much more ($208 or $99, respectively), but 
still far less than those who do not receive the low-income subsidies (including, of course, 
those who are ineligible due to the asset test).  How much these people would pay would 
depend on their other drug spending during the year.  If they had no other spending, the cost 
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would be $464 (Lipitor) or $282 (generic).  If, however, other drug spending put them into the 
doughnut hole, they would face the full cost of the drug:  $1,104 or $376. 
 
CBO Estimates of the Impact of the Asset Test on Eligibility for Low-Income Subsidies 
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated how many otherwise qualified 
low-income beneficiaries will not receive the low-income prescription drug subsidies because 
they will fail the asset test.  It should be kept in mind, however, that CBO’s estimates were 
published before the final regulations were issued by CMS.  This is particularly important 
because the regulations are, in some ways, more generous than the previous asset test 
requirements employed by state Medicaid programs and the federal Supplementary Security 
Income (SSI) program.  Whereas the other programs include as countable assets the value of 
the first automobile exceeding $4,500, and the total value of a second car, the regulations do 
not include any value from automobiles.  As a result, fewer beneficiaries are likely to be 
excluded. 
In estimates published on November 20, 2003, just a few days before Congressional 
passage, CBO estimated that 1.8 million of the 15.1 Medicare beneficiaries with incomes 
below 150% of the FPL (12%) would be ineligible for the low-income subsidies because their 
assets were too high.  This includes:   
 0.4 million of the 7.7 million beneficiaries (5%) with incomes below the FPL; 
 0.4 million of the 3.6 million beneficiaries (11%) with incomes between 101 and 
120% of the FPL; 
 0.5 million of the 2.0 million beneficiaries (25%) with incomes between 121 and 
135% of the FPL; 
 0.5 of the 1.8 million beneficiaries (28%) with incomes between 136 and 150% of the 
FLP.11 
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In a later report released in July 2004, it further estimated that nearly all dual eligibles 
would enroll in the drug benefit program, but that only 45% of other eligible low-income 
beneficiaries would do so.  This surprisingly low expected enrollment projection is based on 
past experiences with QMB and SLMB program participation, coupled with the lower benefit 
levels provided to Subsidy Group C (Exhibit 2).12  This 45 percent rate is somewhat lower 
than the 57 percent estimate provided in CMS’s final regulations.13  Neither set of estimates, 
however, provides detailed calculation methodology.  
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III.  DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
Data  
The data set used in this study is the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The purpose of SIPP is “to provide accurate and 
comprehensive information about the income and program participation of individuals and 
households in the United States, and about the principal determinants of income and program 
participation.”14  SIPP also collects information on individuals’ assets, a necessity for the 
conduct of the present study.  The sampling frame for SIPP includes only the non-
institutionalized population.  
SIPP is a nationally representative panel survey.  To ensure adequate representation, it 
over-samples those with low incomes.  This report is based on the 2001 panel, whose 
members are interviewed three times annually over three years.   Most of the data in this study 
are based on interviews that occurred between October 2002 and January 2003 and refer to 
the period September – December 2002.  The overall sample size in the SIPP file from which 
the data were extracted is 69,143 cases, of which 9,278 are Medicare beneficiaries, and 2,929 
have incomes below 150% of the federal poverty level.15   
 
Methods 
 The study is designed to address how many, and what percentage, of Medicare 
beneficiaries will be precluded from low-income prescription drug subsidies because their 
assets exceed the legislation’s thresholds.  (A more detailed methodology is provided in the 
Appendix.)  All non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries on SIPP were selected, including 
both seniors and those eligible due to disability (N=9,278).  The first task was to estimate the 
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number of low-income beneficiaries eligible for the subsidies if there were no asset test.   Two 
groups are potentially eligible: those who receive Medicaid, SSI, QMB, SLMB, and QI; and 
those who do not receive any of these benefits but who have incomes below 150% of the FPL.  
SIPP indicates if a person has Medicaid or SSI, but not QMB, SLMB, or QI.  This does not 
present a formidable problem, however, because an individual eligible for one of these 
programs must have an income below 135% of the FPL and therefore can be captured with 
SIPP through their income.16   
 The estimated number of Medicare beneficiaries in this study is based upon 2002 data 
from SIPP.  These figures were then adjusted upward to provide the estimated number of 
beneficiaries in 2006, based on projections provided in the 2004 Annual Report of the Boards 
of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance 
Trust Funds.  According to the CMS regulations, income is defined in accordance with SSI 
rules.  Under those rules, certain exclusions are made from income, including the sum of each 
of the following:  the first $20 per month of any type of income, the first $65 per month of 
earned income,17 and half of earnings above $65 per month. 
Each sample member’s income was compared to the FPL.  According to the final 
CMS regulations, income includes that of both the individual and spouse (if any).18  The FPL 
is based on family size, and naturally is higher for larger families.  The final regulations 
define family size to include the individual, his/her spouse, and related persons in the 
household who depend on the individual for half or more of their financial support, which, 
due to data limitations, are confined to the individual’s own children under age 18.   
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 The second task was to estimate how many otherwise eligible individuals will be 
excluded from subsidized prescription drug benefits due to the asset test.  The final 
regulations define eligible assets as follows:  
 “[W]e intended to only consider liquid resources (that is, those that could be 
converted to cash within twenty days) and real estate that is not an applicant’s 
primary residence as resources that are available to the applicant to pay for the 
Part D premiums, deductibles and copayments.  Thus, we would not consider 
their non-liquid resources (for example, a second car) to be available to the 
applicant for this purpose.”19   
 
As a result, only the following assets from SIPP are counted for both the individual 
and his/her spouse: bank accounts; stocks; bonds; mutual funds; retirement accounts such as 
IRAs, Keoghs, and 401(k)s; rental and vacation property; and other investments.  Although it 
is not explicitly included in SIPP, the cash value of life insurance policies is counted as an 
asset, but not the face value of term-life insurance.  Finally, to convert the asset amounts from 
2002 dollars to 2006 dollars (to compare to 2006 asset thresholds), they were multiplied by 
the predicted rate of growth in consumer prices over this four-year period (1.092).20   
 The final task was to determine the assets that are primarily responsible for precluding 
eligibility and the characteristics of individuals who are precluded from the subsidies because 
they fail the asset test.  Sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital 
status, family composition, education, geographic location); health status/usage (self-reported 
health status, hospitalizations, physician visits, prescription drug use); and possession of 
supplemental health insurance were all examined. 
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Exhibit 5 
Projected Eligibility for Low-Income Subsidies, 2006 
 
Total non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries 39.18 m 
      
Not eligible for low-income subsidies (based on 
income) 
 
25.21 m 
       
Potentially eligible for low-income subsidies 
(based on income alone or dual eligibility status) 
 
13.97 m 
 
Low-income beneficiaries not eligible for low-
income subsidies due to asset test 
 
  2.37 m
 
Total eligible for low-income subsidies 
 
11.60 m 
 
Source: Rice and Desmond for the Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005.
IV.  FINDINGS 
 
 
Overall Impact of the Asset Test on Eligibility for Low-Income Drug Subsidies 
 There are an estimated 13.97 million non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries who 
would qualify for low-income subsidized prescription drug benefits in 2006 based on income 
alone, as shown in Exhibit 5.  Among this group, an estimated 2.37 million are expected to be 
ineligible for low-income subsidies due to the asset test.  This represents 17 percent of 
otherwise eligible individuals.  Approximately 70 percent of the 2.37 million who are 
ineligible because of the asset test have incomes below 135% of the FPL, with the remaining 
30% having incomes between 135% and 150% of the FPL.  
  
This figure of 
2.4 million individuals 
failing the asset test in 
2006 is somewhat 
higher than the 1.8 
million calculated by 
CBO in its July 2004 
report.  The authors 
have had discussions 
with CBO staff in order to better understand these differences.  A major reason appears to 
relate to different methods for calculating income.  As noted earlier, this report is informed by 
CMS regulations that had not been released at the time of the CBO report, and which indicate 
that in determining eligibility for subsidized drug benefits, income is to be defined in 
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accordance with SSI regulations.  Under those regulations, the first $20 per month of any type 
of income, the first $65 per month of earned income, and half of earnings above $65 per 
month are excluded.  Using these exclusions, more low-income beneficiaries fall below 150% 
of the FPL, and therefore could be excluded for the drug subsidies by the asset test.  Because 
they tend to have higher incomes relative to other near-poor individuals and families, they are 
in fact more likely to have assets in excess of the thresholds.  Had these exclusions not been 
made, an estimated 2.1 million beneficiaries would have failed the asset test.  Thus, this 
appears to explain half of the difference between the two sets of estimates. 
There are several other reasons that may explain the different estimates.  The CBO 
estimates include the institutionalized population whereas the present report does not.  
Because low-income institutionalized seniors tend to have very low asset levels, this results in 
CBO estimating a lower percentage of people failing the asset test.   The two studies employ 
different data sets that are based on different sampling frames.  CBO uses multiple data 
sources including the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, modified by CBO projections of 
population growth; the Current Population Survey, to adjust income estimates; and SIPP, for 
asset measurement.  The present report relies on SIPP alone.  In addition, this report uses 
more recent data on assets than did CBO, and differences are likely to have arisen from 
CBO’s estimates of asset growth. 
 
Characteristics of Beneficiaries Excluded from Drug Subsidies Due to the Asset Test 
 Exhibit 6 provides the characteristics of individuals who are ineligible for the low-
income prescription drug subsidies due to the asset test (labeled as group D in the table), as 
well as three other groups of beneficiaries: those who are dually eligible for Medicare and 
 16
Medicaid and who therefore will automatically receive the low-income subsidies (group B); 
those who are not dually eligible but who qualify to receive the low-income subsidies due to 
low incomes and assets (group C); and those whose incomes exceed 150% of the FPL, who 
therefore do not qualify because of their incomes (group E).  The first two columns (group A) 
provide figures for the total Medicare non-institutionalized population – that is, the sum of the 
four subgroups (groups B-E). 
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Exhibit 6 
Characteristics of Non-Institutionalized Medicare Beneficiaries by Low-Income Subsidy 
Status  
(estimated counts in thousands) 
 
  Low-Income Beneficiaries  
  
Total 
 
A 
 
Dual eligible 
 
B 
Non-dual 
eligible, low-
income 
subsidy 
eligible 
 
C 
Non-dual 
eligible, low-
income 
subsidy 
ineligible 
due to asset 
test 
D 
Not low 
income,  not 
eligible for 
low-income 
subsidy due 
to income test 
 
E 
Total number 39,176 100% 4,737 100% 6,863 100% 2,368 100% 25,208 100%
           
Under 65 5,074 13.0 2,007 42.4 1,126 16.4 137 5.8 1,804 7.2 
65 - 74 17,818 45.5 1,361 28.7 2,466 35.9 927 39.2 13,065 51.8 
75 - 85 12,528 32.0 1,001 21.1 2,325 33.9 967 40.9 8,235 32.7 
85 and older 3,757 9.6 369 7.8 947 13.8 336 14.2 2,104 8.4 
           
Male 16,907 43.2 1,762 37.2 2,320 33.8 696 29.4 12,219 48.1 
Female 22,269 56.8 2,976 62.8 4,543 66.2 1,672 70.6 13,079 51.9 
           
White 29,165 74.5 2,305 48.7 4,488 65.4 1,921 81.1 20,451 81.1 
African American 3,818 9.8 1,036 21.9 1,104 16.1 83 3.5 1,596 6.3 
Hispanic 3,973 10.1 629 13.3 674 9.8 269 11.4 2,401 9.5 
Other ethnicity 2,220 5.7 768 16.2 598 8.7 95 4.0 760 3.0 
           
Married 21,316 54.4 1,177 24.9 2,225 32.4 892 37.7 17,022 67.5 
Divorced/separated 4,351 11.1 1,148 24.2 1,117 16.3 250 10.6 1,835 7.3 
Widowed 11,343 29.0 1,518 32.0 2,986 43.5 1,099 46.4 5,740 22.8 
Never married 2,166 5.5 894 18.9 535 7.8 127 5.4 610 2.4 
           
Lives alone 11,871 30.3 1,880 39.7 2,862 41.7 1,084 45.8 6,045 24.0 
Lives with spouse 21,316 54.4 1,177 24.9 2,225 32.4 892 37.7 17,022 67.5 
Other  5,989 15.3 1,680 35.5 1,776 25.9 392 16.6 2,141 8.5 
           
Through 8th grade 5,196 13.3 1,485 31.4 1,534 22.4 241 10.2 1,935 7.7 
Some high school 5,569 14.2 998 21.1 1,578 23.0 407 17.2 2,587 10.3 
HS graduate 13,445 34.3 1,250 26.4 2,323 33.9 982 41.5 8,890 35.3 
Some college 8,758 22.4 758 16.0 1,127 16.4 508 21.5 6,365 25.3 
College graduate 6,207 15.8 246 5.2 300 4.4 230 9.7 5,431 21.5 
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  Low-Income Beneficiaries  
  
Total 
 
A 
 
Dual eligible 
 
B 
Non-dual 
eligible, 
low-income 
subsidy 
eligible 
 
C 
Non-dual 
eligible, 
low-income 
subsidy 
ineligible 
due to asset 
test 
D 
Not-low income, 
not eligible for 
low-income 
subsidy due to 
income test 
 
E 
Lives in a MSA 22,830 58.3 2,706 57.1 4,046 59.0 1,314 55.5 14,765 58.6 
Not in a MSA 16,346 41.7 2,031 42.9 2,817 41.1 1,054 44.5 10,443 41.4 
           
Midwest region 8,697 22.5 827 17.7 1,285 18.9 612 26.3 5,973 24.0 
Northeast 
region 7,896 20.4 883 18.8 1,451 21.3 485 20.8 5,077 20.4 
South region 14,925 38.6 1,899 40.5 3,106 45.6 814 34.9 9,105 36.6 
West region 7,198 18.6 1,079 23.0 965 14.2 420 18.0 4,734 19.0 
           
Has private 
health ins. 28,255 72.1 1,046 22.1 3,598 52.4 1,842 77.8 21,769 86.4 
No private 
insurance 10,921 27.9 3,691 77.9 3,265 47.6 526 22.2 3,439 13.6 
           
Excellent/v.good 
Health 10,956 28.0 719 15.2 1,287 18.8 670 28.3 8,280 32.9 
Good health 13,425 34.3 1,261 26.6 2,246 32.7 934 39.5 8,984 35.6 
Fair health 9,331 23.8 1,595 33.7 2,012 29.3 493 20.8 5,232 20.8 
Poor health 5,464 14.0 1,162 24.5 1,319 19.2 271 11.4 2,711 10.8 
           
Hospitalized 
past year 7,753 19.8 1,193 25.2 1,484 21.6 476 20.1 4,600 18.3 
Not hospitalized 31,423 80.2 3,545 74.8 5,379 78.4 1,892 79.9 20,608 81.8 
           
0-1 MD visits in 
past year  6,355 16.2 744 15.7 1,426 20.8 386 16.3 3,799 15.1 
2-3 visits in past 
year 7,891 20.1 828 17.5 1,345 19.6 502 21.2 5,215 20.7 
4-5 visits in past 
year 8,173 20.9 829 17.5 1,317 19.2 513 21.7 5,513 21.9 
6-11 visits in 
past year 8,004 20.4 935 19.7 1,416 20.6 506 21.4 5,147 20.4 
12 visits in past 
year 8,754 22.3 1,400 29.6 1,359 19.8 462 19.5 5,533 22.0 
           
Prescription 
drugs daily 31,028 79.2 3,852 81.3 5,223 76.1 1,845 77.9 20,108 79.8 
Not daily use of 
drugs 8,149 20.8 886 18.7 1,640 23.9 523 22.1 5,100 20.2 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Panel, Wave 6. 
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 There are two sets of relevant comparisons:  (1) low-income beneficiaries who fail the 
asset test (group D) vs. other non-dual eligible, low-income beneficiaries who pass the test 
(group C); and (2) low-income beneficiaries who fail the asset test (group D) vs. those who do 
not qualify for it because their income exceeds 150% of the FPL (group E).  Most of the 
comparisons are statistically significant at the 5% level.21   The only exceptions are for 
comparison (1): MSA, hospitalized in the past year, number of physician visits in the past 
year, and daily use of prescription drugs; and for comparison (2): race (significant at 10% 
level), MSA, region, health status, hospitalized in the past year, and number of physician 
visits in the past year and daily use of prescription drugs. 
 
Comparison with Other Low-Income Beneficiaries 
 
 Those with low incomes who are expected not to meet the asset test have somewhat 
different characteristics than other low-income beneficiaries who are eligible to receive the 
low-income drug subsidies and who are not dually eligible for Medicaid.  Those failing the 
asset tests are more likely to be older, female, unmarried, and living alone.  In these respects 
one might view them as more vulnerable, but in other respects they tend to be better off.  
They have higher education levels, are in better health, and are more likely to have private 
insurance.  They are also more likely to be white.  To illustrate, 55 percent of those failing the 
asset test are age 75 or older, compared to 48 percent of the low-income group who do not fail 
the test; 73 percent graduated from high school, far higher than the 55 percent figure for the 
other group. 
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Comparison with Beneficiaries with Incomes above 150% of the FPL 
 
 This comparison is important because low-income beneficiaries who will not meet the 
asset test will receive the same coverage (and lack of subsidies) as those who do not have low 
incomes.  In nearly all ways, those failing the asset tests are much more vulnerable than 
beneficiaries with higher incomes.  They are far more likely to be older, female, widowed, 
and living alone.  They also have lower education levels and are less likely to have private 
health insurance. 
 Some of the key differences are illustrated in Exhibit 7.    Fifty-five percent of those 
failing the asset test are age 75 and older, compared to 41 percent of beneficiaries with higher 
incomes.  Seventy-one percent failing the test are female, compared to 52 percent of non low-
income beneficiaries.  The most dramatic difference concerns marital status.  Nearly half  
(46%) of those failing the asset test are widowed, twice the share (23%) for those with higher 
incomes.  Forty-three percent of those who would fail the asset test are female widows.  A 
related finding not shown here is that fact that those failing the asset test are far more likely to 
live alone (46%) than are higher-income beneficiaries (24%).  Finally, Exhibit 7 shows that 
22 percent of people failing the test have no private insurance, compared to 14 percent of 
higher income beneficiaries. 
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Exhibit 7
Comparison of Low-Income (Non-Dual Eligible) Beneficiaries 
Who Are Not Eligible for Low-Income Subsides and Non-Poor 
Beneficiaries
Non-dual eligibles who meet 
low-income threshold but fail 
asset test
Non-dual eligibles who do not 
meet low-income threshold
75 & over
55%
Under 75
45%
75 & over
41%
Under 75
59%
Female
71%
Male
29%
Female
52%
Male
48%
Widowed
46%
Other single
16%
Married
38%
Widowed
23%
Other single
10%
Married
67%
No private
health
insurance
22%
Have private
health
insurance
78%
No private
health
insurance
14%
Have private
health
insurance
86%
Total = 25.2 millionTotal = 2.4 million
Note: Of the 39.2 million non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries, this exhibit excludes 
the 4.7 million dual eligibles and the 6.9 million non-dual eligibles who are expected to be 
eligible for low-income subsidy assistance.  
 A clear pattern thus emerges.  Those who fail the asset test are disproportionately 
older widows who live alone.  The most likely scenario is that when a husband dies, income 
plummets, making the widow potentially eligible for the low-income prescription drug 
subsidies.  However, her accumulated assets exceed those allowed under the legislation.  
Aggravating the situation is that asset thresholds are lower for individuals than for couples 
(Exhibit 2).  These people are very vulnerable to financial catastrophe but, because they have 
some accumulated savings, are ineligible for the subsidized prescription drug benefits. 
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Types of Assets that Preclude Eligibility for Low-Income Drug Subsidies 
 
 Exhibit 8 shows the types of assets that are held by beneficiaries failing the asset test.  
The pie wedges show the average percent of total portfolio held in various categories of assets 
by the 2.37 million 
otherwise eligible 
Medicare beneficiaries 
whose assets exceed the 
thresholds in the 
legislation.  These 
beneficiaries hold, on 
average, 44 percent of 
their total assets with 
financial institutions; that is, checking and savings bank accounts and the like.  Most of the 
remainder are other financial assets such as stocks, mutual funds, and retirement accounts 
such as IRAs, Keoghs, and 401(k) accounts.  On average, only 19 percent of assets are equity 
in real estate (other than one’s own house, which is not counted) and ownership of a business. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average Percent of Total Assets Held in 
Particular Assets
Assets at 
Financial 
institutions 
44%
Bond, Securities, and 
US Savings Bonds
4%
Equity in Stocks 
and Mutual Funds 
18%
Other Financial Assets 
2%
IRA, Keogh, 
401(k) Accounts 
13%
Equity in Real 
Estate Other 
than Own Home 
16%
Business Equity 
3%
Exhibit 8
Source: Rice and Desmond analysis of SIPP, 2001 Panel, Wave 6 for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
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Exhibit 9 
Percent of Beneficiaries Who Would Lose Low-Income Subsidies Solely on the Basis of 
Their Ownership of Particular Assets  
 
Assets at financial 
institutions 
 
49% 
Bonds, securities, 
US savings bonds 5 
Equity in stocks 
and mutual funds 25 
Other financial 
assets 3 
IRA, Keogh, 401(k) 
accounts 20 
Equity in real 
estate other than 
own home 
19 
Business equity 4 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Panel, Wave 6. 
 
 
 In some instances, one type of asset alone puts a beneficiary over the threshold.    
Almost half (49%) of those who fail the asset test would fail it solely on the basis of their 
assets in financial institutions.  No other type of asset would, alone, disqualify more than 25% 
of individuals. 
 Exhibit 10 illustrates by how much individuals fail the asset test.22  Each bar 
represents $5,000 in assets.  Thus, the first bar indicates that of the people who fail the asset 
test, about 13% exceed it by $5,000 or less; the second bar shows that another 9% exceed it 
by $5,000 - $10,000, etc.  The noteworthy pattern that emerges is that a large proportion of 
the 2.37 million people who are excluded from the low-income drug subsidies have assets that 
are not excessively high by most definitions.  In fact, half of those who fail the asset test have 
excess assets of $35,000 or less.   These savings would not pay for a year of nursing home 
care in most areas of the country.  The amounts by which the unmarried fail the asset test are 
even more modest:  41% exceed the threshold by $25,000 or less. 
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Exhibit 10 
Low-Income Beneficiaries with Assets Exceeding the Threshold 
0
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Note: Beneficiaries whose assets exceed the low-income subsidy threshold by more than $500,000 are not 
included. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Panel, Wave 6. 
 
 These asset levels are, by most standards, very modest.  Suppose that a woman (the 
typical case) exceeds the asset test by $35,000, which is the median amount.  Liquidating 
these assets to pay for the prescription drug spending in the doughnut hole would reduce her 
current income through forgone interest; moreover, it would leave her with a very small 
financial buffer should she become ill and fall subject to large out-of-pocket costs, or suffer 
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any other financial reversal.  She would eventually be eligible for the subsidized prescription 
drug benefits, but at a cost of having spent down nearly all of her life savings. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This study estimates that in 2006, when the new Medicare prescription drug benefit 
goes into effect, 2.37 million low-income Medicare beneficiaries will not qualify for 
subsidized coverage because they fail the asset test.  As a result, these individuals will face 
the same “doughnut hole” cost-sharing requirements as wealthier beneficiaries.  This means 
that in addition to paying full monthly premiums, they will be responsible for substantial out-
of-pocket costs – e.g., $3,600 of the first $5,100 of annual prescription drug spending on 
covered drugs in 2006.   
The study further examines the types of beneficiaries who will be excluded by the 
asset test, as well as the types of assets responsible.  Perhaps the most noteworthy finding is 
that the asset test will fall most heavily on those who are widowed.  Whereas only 29 percent 
of Medicare beneficiaries are widowed, nearly half – 46% – of those failing the asset test are 
widowed and nearly all of these (43% of the 46%) are women.  Widows, tend to be older, live 
alone, and have more chronic illnesses necessitating prescription drug purchases, but have 
less family support as well.  Put another way, the life event (death of a husband) leads to 
reduced income and thus more of a need for subsidies, but as written, the legislation 
effectively excludes many widows from these subsidies. 
It is hardly surprising that most individuals who do not meet the asset test have 
relatively modest assets, which tend to be bank accounts rather than stocks, mutual funds, and 
bonds.  They have little in the way of private retirement accounts such as IRAs and 401(k)s, 
real estate beyond their own home, and almost no equity in businesses.  This would be 
expected among a population of low-income individuals. 
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The study’s findings raise serious questions about the equity of the asset test.  During 
their working years, Americans are encouraged to save for retirement and the possibility that 
they will face sizable long-term care expenses.  Those to whom this message is most salient 
will have little or no income beyond what they receive from Social Security.  By 
accumulating modest amounts of assets, either through bank accounts or retirement-savings 
vehicles, these same people have guaranteed that they will not qualify for the low-income 
Medicare drug subsidies – but the vast majority use prescription drugs every day.  Using more 
common parlance, they find themselves in a “Catch-22.”  If they do save, they are disqualified 
from the subsidies.  If they do not save, they will receive the subsidies but will have almost 
nothing to fall back upon besides their Social Security checks.  And this burden tends to fall 
on the most vulnerable of seniors: older, low-income widows living alone.   
This dynamic appears to be inequitable, given the groups of seniors who are most 
affected, and unfair because it penalizes both savings and widowhood.  Modifying or 
eliminating the asset test would help protect those disadvantaged by low incomes who would 
be excluded from subsidized prescription drug benefits due to the asset test.  
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APPENDIX 
PROCEDURES FOR USING SIPP TO EVALUATE 
MEDICARE ASSET TEST 
 
The data set used for simulating the impact of the asset test on eligibility for the low-income 
subsidy was the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 2001 panel, Wave 6.  
SIPP provides reasonably accurate estimates of asset ownership, especially for the low-
income population23.  Assets not included in the SIPP Wave 6 asset module include the value 
of defined contribution pension accounts (other than 401(k) and thrift accounts, which are 
included), the cash value of life insurance, and some annuities and trusts.   
 
Wave 6 provides the most current data available as of this writing on asset ownership.  SIPP 
interviews its subjects 3 times a year, in 4 rotations.  The reference period for Wave 6 is late 
2002: September-December.  For asset ownership and demographic/health characteristics, the 
measures in SIPP represent a snapshot as of the late 2002 reference period.  Some items were 
available on the asset module; others were be picked up by linking to the SIPP core module.  
Asset information for each individual’s spouse was merged onto the individual’s record.  
Weights were taken from the asset module. 
 
Income is reported monthly in the core module.  For each person (and each person’s spouse), 
we added up monthly income over the past 12 months (this involves using core file Waves 4, 
5, and 6).  Where income data are missing for a month, we filled in with income averaged 
over the non-missing months.24 
 
We selected persons covered by Medicare during the reference month [“Was … covered by 
Medicare in this month?”]. 
 
Variable definitions 
 
Our task was to identify and describe Medicare beneficiaries eligible for full and limited 
subsidies for Medicare drug coverage, and to identify and describe beneficiaries excluded 
from these subsidies by the asset test.  Eligibility is based on enrollment in other programs 
(Medicaid, SSI, QMB, SLMB, QI), income relative to poverty guidelines, and asset 
ownership. 
 
ENROLLMENT IN OTHER PROGRAMS 
 
Full benefit dual eligibles are defined as recipients of Medicaid, SSI, QMB, SLMB or QI.  We 
can identify in SIPP those who are covered by Medicaid [“Was … covered by Medicaid in 
this month?”] or SSI [Federal SSI monthly coverage flag].  We were unable to identify 
enrollment in the QMB, SLMB, or QI programs using SIPP.    
 
The consequence of our being unable to directly identify QMBs, SLMBs, and QIs on SIPP is 
that these individuals were not categorically assigned to the full subsidy group, but were be 
subjected to the income and asset tests.  If there are any persons that might have been in one 
of those programs, but who have assets that exclude them from the subsidies, we will 
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overstate the impact of the asset test.  But this is unlikely because these programs tend to have 
stricter asset tests than does the Medicare prescription drug legislation.  What will happen 
with these individuals is that the poorest of them will be able to do no better than subsidy 
group B (see Exhibits 2 and 3) whereas if they had been categorically eligible, they might 
have gotten into subsidy group A.  This does not pose much of a problem because the study 
focuses on who will be excluded from the subsidies, rather than into which subsidy category 
individuals will fall. 
 
INCOME RELATIVE TO POVERTY GUIDELINES 
 
Per the regulations, we counted the income of the individual and his/her spouse, if any.  For 
the federal poverty level, we used the 2002 HHS Poverty Guidelines25.  The poverty level 
varies by family size;  CMS’s regulations define family size to include the individual, his/her 
spouse, and related persons in the household who depend on the individual for ½ or more of 
their financial support.  We do not have the data in SIPP to determine portion of financial 
support;  instead we approximate the regulations’ definition of family size by including the 
individual, his/her spouse, and the individual’s own children under 18 in the family. 
 
The legislation and regulations refer to Section 1612 of the Social Security Act, which are the 
SSI rules for determining income.  In that section, income is defined as earned and unearned, 
and a list of exclusions from income is given.  Per the legislation, we subtracted $20/month of 
unearned income, $65/month of earnings and half the amount over $65.  In determining 
poverty status, we used 2002 income and 2002 poverty guidelines.  The $20 and $65 amounts 
in 2006 were adjusted to 2002 dollars. 
 
ASSETS 
 
CMS’s regulations state (70 FR 4369, January 28k 2005): 
 
 “[W]e intended to only consider liquid resources (that is, those that could be converted to 
cash within twenty days) and real estate that is not an applicant’s primary residence as 
resources that are available to the applicant to pay for the Part D premiums, deductibles and 
copayments.  Thus, we would not consider their non-liquid resources (for example, a second 
car) to be available to the applicant for this purpose.” 
 
We note that the exclusion of the second car in particular is different from what is done for 
other programs. 
 
From SIPP, we are including dollar amounts of the following assets: 
 
Interest earning accounts   
Non interest earning accounts   
Bonds/US securities    
Face value of US savings bonds  
Stocks/mutual funds     
IRAs      
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Keoghs     
401Ks      
Rental property    
Vacation/undeveloped property  
Other investments    
 
The asset cutoffs in the legislation are given in 2006 dollars as $6,000; $9,000; $10,000; and 
$20,000.  We inflated SIPP assets (which are in 2002 dollars) to 2006 using CBO actual and 
forecast Consumer Price Index values, providing percentage changes in the CPI for 2003-
200626.  This yields a cumulative inflation factor from 2002 to 2006 of 1.092.   
 
Simulations 
 
1. Identify dual eligibles.   
 
2. Identify persons with regard to poverty: 
Less than 100% 
100% to less than 135% 
135% to less than 150% 
150% and higher 
 
3. Identify persons with regard to asset limits: 
Less than $6,000 (individual) or $9,000 (couple) 
$6,000 - $10,000 (individual) or $9,000 - $20,000 (couple) 
$10,000 and higher (individual) or $20,000 and higher (couple) 
 
4. Determine eligibility for low income subsidy groups A, B, and C using just the dual 
eligible and income criteria. 
 
5. Determine eligibility using all criteria including the asset test. 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Beneficiaries can also receive drug benefits through managed care plans, which are now 
called “Medicare Advantage” plans.  These include both HMOs and PPOs.  Because the drug 
benefit is part of a larger benefit package, its cost is built into the overall premium for the 
plans. 
 
2 QMB is the Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries program; SLMB is the Specified Low-Income 
Medicare Beneficiary Program; and QI is the Qualifying Individuals program.    Eligibility 
criteria for these programs can be found at: 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/dualeligibles/bbadedef.asp.   
Note that our estimate of the dual eligible population is lower than may be expected because it 
counts only the non-institutionalized.  In their June 2004 report to Congress (found at 
http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/June04_entire_report.pdf),  the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission estimated from the 2001 MCBS Cost and Use file 
that there were 6.2 to 7.0 million dual eligibles (depending on how they defined dual 
eligibility), of whom nearly one quarter were institutionalized.  Our estimates are consistent 
with these. 
 
3 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services “2005 HHS Poverty Guidelines” can be 
found at: http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/05poverty.shtml 
 
4 The main data set used in this study, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, is 
based on a sampling frame of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population. 
 
5 The statute also requires that insurers apply the generic copayment levels to preferred 
multiple source drugs. 
 
6 70 FR 4468, January 28, 2005. 
 
7 Mays, J., M. Brenner, T. Neuman, J. Cubanski, and G. Claxton.  “Estimates of Medicare 
Beneficiaries’ Out-of-Pocket Drug Spending in 2006.”  Kaiser Family Foundation, November 
2004. 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=489
47 
 
8 This information is from the website, Rxlist.com.  See: 
http://www.rxlist.com/top200.htm 
 
9 This information is from the website, Drugstore.com.  See: 
http://www.drugstore.com/pharmacy/prices/drugprice.asp?ndc=00071015773&trx=1Z5006 
 
10 This information is from the website, Qualitygenerics.com.  See: 
http://www.qualitygenerics.com/generic-lipitor.shtml 
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11 Congressional Budget Office.  Letter to Hon. Don Nickles, Chairman, Committee on the 
Budget, U.S. Senate.  November 20, 2003. 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4814&sequence=0 
 
12 Congressional Budget Office. “A Detailed Description of CBO’s Cost Estimate for the 
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit.”  July, 2004. 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5668&sequence=0 
 
13 70 FR 4468, January 28, 2005. 
 
14 http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/intro.html 
 
15 The weighted counts are 37.6 million Medicare beneficiaries, and 11.1 million with incomes 
below 150% of the poverty level. 
 
16 The consequence of our being unable to directly identify QMBs, SLMBs, and QIs on SIPP 
is that these individuals will not be categorically assigned to the full subsidy group, but will 
be subjected to the income and asset tests.  If there are any persons that might have been in 
one of those programs, but who have assets that exclude them from the subsidies, we will 
overstate the impact of the asset test.  But this is unlikely because these programs tend to have 
stricter asset tests than does the Medicare prescription drug legislation.  What will happen 
with these individuals is that the poorest of them will be able to do no better than subsidy 
group B (see Exhibits 2 and 3) whereas if they had been categorically eligible, they might 
have gotten into subsidy group A.  This does not pose much of a problem because the study 
focuses on who will be excluded from the subsidies, rather than in which subsidy category 
individuals will fall. 
 
17 In Section 1612 of the Social Security Act, earned income includes wages, net earnings 
from self employment, and royalties. 
 
18 70 FR 4368, January 28, 2005. 
 
19 70 FR 4369, January 28, 2005. 
 
20 Predicted inflation factors come from the Congressional Budget Office:  
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/18xx/doc1824/EconProjectionsTables.pdf 
 
21 Groups were compared using Chi-square tests that corrected for the SIPP sampling design. 
 
22 Exhibit 9 includes only those sample members from SIPP exceeding the asset test threshold 
by $500,000 or less.  There were eight sample with assets in excess of this amount, and they 
are excluded from the graph to make it fit onto a single page.  These eight individuals, when 
weighted by the SIPP sampling weights, represent 1.6 percent of those who fail the asset test. 
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23 See: Czajka, J.A., J.E. Jacobson, and S. Cody, “Survey Estimates of Wealth: A Comparative 
Analysis and Review of the Survey of Income and Program Participation,” Washington, DC:  
Mathematica Policy Research, for a careful examination of the accuracy of SIPP asset 
measurements. 
 
24 94% of the sample have complete income data for all 12 months. 
 
25 http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/02poverty.htm 
 
26 http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/18xx/doc1824/EconProjectionsTables.pdf 
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